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I. INTRODUCTION
This article aims to provide a fairly succinct,I practical analysis of
the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the
"supreme court" for all questions of interpretation arising under the
EEC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties) has developed one particular funda-
mental principle of Community law, the doctrine of "legitimate expecta-
tions". The emphasis throughout is not only on the exact legal
formulation of the doctrine, but also on whether or not the doctrine can
be said to match up to expectations that, economically, might be re-
garded as "legitimate". Before embarking on the substance, it may be
useful to set out briefly, for those who are perhaps unfamiliar with the
way in which the judicial machinery of the European Community2 oper-
ates, a description of how cases in which this principle has been pleaded
come to arise and how they reach the Court.
The three Treaties establishing the European Communities are fairly
* The author served as "riferendaire" (law clerk) to Advocate General, later Judge, Sir Gordon
Slynn at the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg from 1987 to 1990. She
is currently Director of European Legal Studies at University College London and is in part-time
practice at the English Bar.
1 For a much more lengthy analysis, also along economic/legal lines, see E. Sharpston, Legiti-
mate expectations and economic reality, 15 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 103-160 (1990).
2 Throughout this article, reference is made to "the European Community" as though there
were one single European Community. In fact, there are three legally separate communities: the
European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community, established respectively by the EEC Treaty, the ECSC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty. Unless otherwise stated, all references are to EEC Treaty articles and EEC secon-
dary legislation.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:87(1990)
specific about who does what in the general scheme of operations. Thus,
the Council of Ministers is the Communities' chief political and legisla-
tive authority. The Commission's functions include detailed manage-
ment of certain sectors of the economy (the various agricultural markets,
and steel production, for example) and acting as a supervisory watchdog
to enforce compliance with certain Treaty rules (for example, the compe-
tition rules of the EEC Treaty). The European Parliament provides
political input and has an increasingly important advisory capacity. The
role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (here referred
to as "the European Court")3 is to see to it that, in the interpretation and
application of the EEC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties, "the law is ob-
served". 4 Indeed, it is well established that, where the Council and Com-
mission have to appraise complex economic matters, they enjoy a great
deal of discretion; and the European Court's review of that discretion is a
limited one.5 In the words of the European Court's own assessment of its
role, ".... the Commission enjoys a significant freedom of evaluation both
as regards the taking into account of possible factors of disturbance and
in choosing the means of dealing with them .... When examining the
lawfulness of the exercise of such freedom, the courts cannot substitute
their own evaluation of the matter for that of the competent authority,
but must restrict themselves to examining whether the evaluation...
contains a patent error or constitutes a misuse of power".6
Where the process of judicial review of the validity of a Community
act or decision begins will depend, to a considerable extent, on what sort
of measure and what market sectors are involved. Thus, the individual
3 At the risk of stating the obvious, it may be helpful to recall that there are three courts in
Western Europe that are very frequently confused: the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties in Luxembourg, with whose caselaw this article is concerned; the European Court of human
Rights in Strasbourg, France, which interprets the European Convention on Human Rights; and the
International Court of Justice in The Hague, The Netherlands, which is the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations.
4 Article 164 EEC, Article 31 ECSC, Article 136 Euratom. The ECSC text is fuller than the
EEC and Euratom texts, inasmuch as it contains the additional words "and of rules laid down for
the implementation thereof". The absence of those words in the EEC and Euratom Treaties has
caused no difficulty in practice-indeed, the European Court spends a considerable proportion of its
time interpreting regulations enacted in implementation of the EEC Treaty.
5 See Case 42/84 Remia and Others v. Commission 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2545 at para-
graph 34 of the judgment and Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v. Council 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1923, at paragraph 21 of the judgment, respectively.
6 Case 78/74 Deuka v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelleftir Getreide und Futtermittel 1975 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 421 (relating to regulatory control of agricultural markets), at paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
judgment. Cf. slightly different formulations in Case 98/78 Racke v. HZA Mainz 1979 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 69 (at paragraph 5) and Case 42/84 Remia, supra (at paragraph 34). (Here, as elsewhere




trader or enterprise usually encounters measures of agricultural market
management (such as those governing the grant of export refunds for
certain products) at the national level, since the implementation of such
Community measures is normally delegated to the appropriate national
administrative authorities in the various Member States. In contrast, in
such matters as the allocation and monitoring of a steel quota, or an anti-
dumping undertaking, the enterprise will be dealing directly with the
Commission in its supervisory/watchdog role. It follows (fairly natu-
rally) that there are two main routes by which a case in which the princi-
ple of legitimate expectations is invoked by an individual trader or
enterprise will get to the European Court. If dealings have been directly
with the Commission and have resulted in an administrative decision
which the trader or enterprise wishes to challenge, a direct action will be
brought under Article 173 EEC,7 seeking the annulment of the decision
or the reduction or annulment of the fine. If the trader or enterprise has
met with opposition from a national administrative authority, it will nor-
mally bring proceedings against that authority in the Member State's na-
tional courts and will then seek to persuade the national judge to suspend
those proceedings and request a preliminary ruling on one or more points
of interpretation of Community law from the European Court-the "ref-
erence for a preliminary ruling" under Article 177 EEC.'
By whichever route the case reaches it, the European Court will
then examine the validity of the Community measure at issue with re-
gard, not only to the relevant express Treaty provisions and the interpre-
tation already given to these in existing caselaw, but also in the light of
certain "fundamental principles" that it has itself developed, drawing on
the legal traditions of the different Member States. Occasionally, the Eu-
ropean Court will hold that Community legislation or decisions are inva-
lid because one of these fundamental principles such as legitimate
expectation, proportionality, and the principle of nondiscrimination-
have been violated. The doctrine of legitimate expectations is "undenia-
bly part of Community law".9 The question is then, how and in what
circumstances is it used? What behavior will create a legitimate expecta-
tion on which the economic agent can rely? On the one hand, economic
activity takes place against a background 6f uncertainty-should one re-
gard all changes in the regulatory framework as just one further hazard?
On the other hand, economic agents have to be able to place some reli-
7 Or Article 33 ECSC in coal and steel matters, or Article 146 Euratom, as the case may be.
8 Or Article 41 ECSC, or Article 150 Euratom, as appropriate.
9 Advocate General Lenz in Joined Cases 63 and 147/84 Finsider v. Commission 1985 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2857 at p. 2865.
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ance on something if continuing economic relationships are to be sus-
tained. Certainly, insurance can often be used to pass on the loss-
should it occur-to someone else; but over-insurance represents a misal-
location of resources. For both legal reasons (an estoppel-type argu-
ment) and economic reasons (sometimes the economic agent should be
able to rely on the administration not changing the rules in the middle of
the game), a doctrine of legitimate expectations is attractive.
II. AGRICULTURE
The majority of the cases in which legitimate expectations have been
pleaded concern the various agricultural markets and the steel industry.
That is, on the whole, unsurprising from an economic point of view.
Both agriculture and steel are characterized by a high level of regulatory
control.
The general rule appears to be that the European Court will usually
be prepared to back the Council and/or Commission and to hold that
they are entitled to have a fairly wide margin of maneuver in market
management, even where the chosen scheme has been subjected to fairly
heavy criticism. This ties in with the basic principle--essential, it is sug-
gested, to a rational attempt at market management by the public author-
ities-that those authorities should be free to legislate (and to modify
legislation) in the general economic interest, in the light of what they
perceive to be the requirements of a changing overall economic situation.
Thus, in Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV and Van Dik
Food Products (Lopik) BV v. Commission, 10 the Court stated, "... any
trader in regard to whom an institution has given rise to justified hopes
may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. On
the other hand, if a prudent and discriminating trader could have fore-
seen the adoption of a Community measure likely to affect his interests,
he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted."11 The Euro-
pean Court went on to hold that the "prudent and discriminating trader"
ought to have taken into account the possibility that another "Christmas
butter" scheme would be run, despite the earlier criticism of such
schemes as a means of disposing of surplus Community butter.12
10 1987 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1155.
11 Id at Paragraph 44, citing Case 87/77 Liihrs v. HZA Hamburg-Jonas 1978 E. Comm. Ct. .
Rep. 169, infra.
12 See also Case 92/77 An Bord Bainne Co-operative v. Minister of Agriculture 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 497 and-a more extreme example showing that individual traders cannot dictate to the
Community institutions what their policy choices should be-Joined Cases 54 to 60/76 Compagnie
Industrielle etAgricole du Comtd de Loheac and Others v. Council and Commission 1977 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 645.
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The Community institutions do not, however, enjoy a completely
unfettered discretion in their market management. Two striking recent
examples to the contrary are CAse 120/86 Mulder v. Minister van
Landbouw en Visseri and Case 170/86 Von Deetzen v. HZA Hamburg-
Jonas,3 which concerned the position, when the milk "superlevy" was
introduced, of farmers who had meanwhile given give-year non-market-
ing undertakings, and who found themselves without a reference quan-
tity in the year chosen as the "reference year" and thus effectively
excluded from the dairy market. The European Court held that, while a
producer who had freely chosen to stop production for a certain period
could not legitimately expect to be able to resume production under the
same conditions as before, such a producer (who had been encouraged by
a Community measure to suspend production for a limited period in the
general interest and in return for a premium) could legitimately expect
not to be made subject to specific restrictions arising precisely from the
fact that she or he had taken advantage of the option offered by the Com-
munity legislation. The superlevy regulation was declared partially inva-
lid as breaching those producers' legitimate expectations.14 As Advocate
General Slynn put it in his Opinion in Case 120/86 Mulder, what had
happened "crosses the line between what is merely 'hard business luck'
and what is unreasonable treatment.""5
So much for basic market management in the agricultural sector.
The web of financial arrangements surrounding Community trade in ag-
ricultural products has given rise to a considerable number of the legiti-
mate expectations cases. The inexpert do not play in this market, which
provides considerable opportunities for speculative gains-and also
losses. The European Court has tended to look askance at legitimate
expectations arguments raised by traders who found themselves on the
wrong end of a particular deal. "[F]requent changes in monetary com-
pensatory amounts ["MCAs"] in accordance with the state of the market
at the time is a characteristic feature of the system,"' 6 and no legitimate
expectation in the status quo derives from the fact that there is usually a
13 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2321; 1988 E. Comm. Ct J. Rep. 2355 respectively.
14 See Case 120/86 Mulder, paragraphs 23-27; Case 170/86 Von Deetzen, paragraphs 12-16.
The European Court's decision caused considerable problems for the Council, which found itself
trying to conjure up additional milk quotas out of thin air. There is now a plethora of further cases
challenging the measures that were eventually adopted to try to give effect to the European Court's
judgment.
15 1988 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. at p. 2341. For a less extreme example of successful legitimate
expectations, see Case 5/75 Deuka v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstellefdr Getreide und Futtermittel 1975
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 759.
16 Case 88/78 HZA Hamburg-Jonas v. Kendermann 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2477.
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time-lag before the financial mechanisms are changed in order to reflect
underlying currency fluctuations.
Two leitmotiven of the European Court's decisions on non-retroac-
tive changes in MCAs may perhaps be identified. First, the European
Court regards speculative risk as a risk voluntarily assumed whose conse-
quences are not to be altered judicially: indeed, Community measures
may then be described as "a justified precaution against purely specula-
tive activities." 17
Secondly, the European Court sees the purpose of the MCA system
as being, "in particular, to obviate the difficulties which monetary insta-
bility may create for the proper functioning of the common organizations
of the market, rather than to protect the individual interests of trad-
ers" 1 -- that is, the furtherance of the public, rather than the private,
weal.
Against that background, it is scarcely surprising that MCA cases
involving legitimate expectations tend to be unsuccessful.19 Similarly,
where the market organization has been structured so as to give traders a
fairly straight choice between security (via advance fixing of MCAs or
export restitution or both) and taking a gamble (with the possibility of
extra gain, but also of unexpected loss if the trader guesses wrong),20 the
European Court has refused to recognize legitimate expectations where
traders chose the more speculative route (or ingeniously managed to turn
the "secure" route into a quasi-speculative route),21 or where the previ-
ous economic situation was one of no real certainty and where, therefore,
the contested action has produced no intrinsic change.22 Even where ad-
vance fixing is used as intended, traders cannot have a legitimate expecta-
tion in something which is entirely divorced from the objective of that
adjustment provision, which is unforeseeable at the time when the
amount was fixed in advance and which it is therefore clear cannot have
17 Case 2/75 Einfuhr und Vorratstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel v. Mackprang 1975 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 607 at paragraph 4 of the judgment.
18 Case 97/76 Merkur Aussenhandel GmbH and Co. KG v. Commission 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1063 at paragraph 5 of the judgment.
19 See, e.g., Case 126/76Firma Gebrffder Dietz v. Commission 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2431;
Case 152/80 Debayser SA et aL v. Directeur du Fonds d'Intervention et de Rdgularisation du marchd
du sucre et aL 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1291; Case 146/77 British Beef Co. Ltd. v. Intervention
Board for Agricultural Produce 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1347; Case 281/82 Unifrex v. Commis-
sion and Council 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1969.
20 See Case 112/77 Firma August Tpfer & Co. v. Commission 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1019.
21 See Case 62/83 Eximo Molkereierzeugnisse Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Commission 1984 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2295.




been taken into account among the reasons which led the trader to re-
quest advance fixing.
23
To have a legitimate expectation in the advantages of advance fixing,
the trader must also comply precisely with all the requirements; 24 and
there must be no suspicion of possible speculative activity.2 However, if
the trader has behaved prudently in every way, the European Court is
prepared, in principle, to uphold a straightforward claim to legitimate
expectations in the context of advance fixing. In Case 74/74 Comptoir
National Technique Agricole (CNTA) v. Commission,26 the European
Court held that, while the system of compensatory amounts could not be
considered to be tantamount to a guarantee for traders against the risks
of alteration of exchange rates, the application of the compensatory
amounts in practice avoided the exchange risk, so that a trader, even a
prudent one, might be induced to omit to cover himself against such risk.
A trader might therefore legitimately expect that, for transactions he had
irrevocably undertaken, no unforeseen alteration would occur which
could have the effect of causing him inevitable loss, by re-exposing him to
the exchange risk. In the absence of an overriding matter of public inter-
est, the Commission would act in violation of those traders' legitimate
expectations if it abolished with immediate effect and without warning
the application of compensatory amounts in a specific sector without
adopting transitional measures which would at least permit traders either
to avoid the loss which would have been suffered in the performance of
existing irrevocable export contracts or to be compensated for that loss.
27
In the context of a long-term investment project in the agricultural
sector, the European Court will also uphold a claim of legitimate expec-
tations if the Commission has been very slow to detect an error that
23 Case 100/74 Cam SA v. Commission 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1393. Cf Joined Cases 44 to
51/77 Groupement d'Interet Economique Union Malt and Others v. Commission 1978 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 57, where the European Court drew a sharp distinction between the rules relating to the
advance fixing of refunds and the rules relating to the advance payment of the refund fixed in ad-
vance--the trade circles concerned could not have been unaware, in the light of the development of
the malt market, that the maintenance in force of the system for advancepayment of the refund gave
rise to very serious difficulties and that change was likely.
24 Case 316/86 HZA Hamburg-Jonas v. Firma P. Krzicken 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2213; cf
Case 172/89 Vandemoortele NV v. Commission (pending).
25 See Case 338/85 Pardini v. Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero 1988 E. Comm. CL J. Rep.
2041 for a fairly extreme example.
26 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533.
27 ML at Paragraphs 40-43. For the subsequent history of the case, see 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 797. Note, however, that the European Court appears sometimes to give greater weight to the
supposed (subjective) intention of the legislator than to an (objective) assessment of what traders
might legitimately expect: Joined Cases 67 to 87/75 Lesieur Cotelle and Associates SA v. Commis-
sion 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 391.
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could not, on any view, have been detected by the recipient of re-struc-
turing assistance from Community funds.28
A major problem in the agricultural context-as indeed in other sec-
tors-is the question of retroactive legislation. Such legislation is proba-
bly the single element most likely to destroy traders' and
businesspersons' confidence in the way in which an economic system is
being managed-as witness the extreme reluctance of multinational com-
panies (despite apparently tempting subsidies, exemptions or fiscal ad-
vantages) to invest in developing countries which have a bad track record
of changing their minds and/or expropriating foreign holdings retroac-
tively. If such legislation is to be permitted at all, the conditions for de-
termining its validity need to be applied very strictly, on the basis of a
thorough examination of the underlying economic factors. Valid retro-
active legislation should be the unusual exception to an otherwise general
rule.
The best economic starting point is perhaps the assessment of the
temporal effect of Community economic legislation offered by Advocate
General Deutheillet de Lamothe in Case 37/70 Rewe Zentrale GmbH v.
HZA Emmerich:29
"... The case-law of the Court is very subtle with regard to the temporal
effect of Community acts.
"In fact the Court concedes that although in general the principle of
legal certainty militates against a Community act's taking effect from a
point in time before its publication, the application of this principle must be
tempered with the requirements of economic law. This in fact implies that,
going beyond an overstrict notion of the principle of non-retroactivity, a
distinction must be made between retroactivity stricto sensu and a new situ-
ation termed by various contemporary experts in public law 'the immediate
application of new provisions to pre-existing situations', which is frequently
encountered in economic affairs.
"In fact, as regards laws relating to economics the economic occur-
rence is very often the source and basis of the legislative measure; the occur-
rence, its seriousness and consequences condition both the introduction and
the lawfulness of that measure.
"It is the economic occurrence and not the measure resulting from it
which constitutes the threat to legal certainty and consequently it is both
necessary and desirable that it should be the date of that occurrence and not
that of the legal measure which establishes the point of departure for the
effects of the latter.",
30
In two cases concerning the application of MCAs to the wine sector,
28 Case 15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d'Abruzzo ("CCA") v. Commission 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1005. Cf Joined Cases 63 and 147/84 Finsider SPA v. Commission, infra.
29 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 23.
30 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at p. 45.
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Case 98/78 A. Racke v. HZA Mainz3 and Case 99/78 Weingut Gustav
Decker KG v. HZA Landau,32 the European Court expressly accepted
that retroactive legislation was not invalidated by the principle of legiti-
mate expectations if certain conditions were met: in a slightly circular
definition, it held that, "Although in general the principle of legal cer-
tainty precludes a Community measure from taking effect from a point in
time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where the
purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations
of those concerned are duly respected." 33 In terms of economic analysis,
the "purpose to be achieved" part of the Racke test does not cause partic-
ular difficulty, given the caselaw cited earlier as to the importance of the
public weal over the private interest.3" When the legitimate expectations
of those concerned will, and will not, be deemed to be respected is more
arguable.35
Indeed, where regulations are not expressly stated (with reasons) to
be retroactive, the Racke test has been duly applied so as to avoid retro-
activity.36 The test has also occasionally been applied to uphold a claim
31 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69.
32 1979 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 101.
33 Case 98/78 Racke, paragraph 20, Case 99/78 Decker, paragraph 8.
34 See, eg., Case 126/76 Dietz, supra. For a specific retroactivity case with a strong public weal
element and no very plausible traders' expectations, see Case 84/81 Staple Dairy Products Ltd v.
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce 1982 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 1763.
35 See the series of "isoglucose cases": (i) Case 125/77 Koninklyke Scholten-Honig NVv. Hoofd-
produktschap voorAkkerbouwprodukten 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1991, (ii) Case 138/79 Roquette
Frires SA v. Council 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3333 and CAse 139/79 Maizena GmbH v. Council
1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3393, (iii) Case 108/81 G.R. Amylum v. Council 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3107, Case 110/81 SA Roquette Freres v. Council 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3159 and Case
114/81 Tunnel Refineries Ltd. v. Council 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3189 for a striking example of
retroactive legislation being upheld by the European Court against a background of underlying tech-
nical and economic changes, policy shifts and Pyrrhic procedural victories. In a different context
(the need to have smooth transitional arrangements for the accession of Greece to the Community),
see Case 337/88 Societd Agricola Fattoria Alimentare Spa (SAFA) v. Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato, judgment of 9 January 1990, not yet reported, for an interesting example of how far the
European Court is prepared to go in applying the Racke test to uphold retroactive legislation. For
the a posteriori recovery of import duties-a form of quasi-retroactivity-see Case 210/87 Remo v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, judgment of 5 October 1988, not yet reported. Note also
that being a customs agent is a hazardous occupation so far as such recovery is concerned: see, e.g.,
Case 161/88 Friedrich Binder GmbH v. HZA Bad Reichenhall, judgment of 12 Verpackungsbedarf
GmbHv. HZA Itzehoe, judgment of 28 June 1990, not yet reported; see also Joined Cases 98/83 and
230/83 Van Gend et Loos NV and Expeditiebedrijf Wim Bosman BVv. Commission 1984 E. Comm.
Ct. 3. Rep. 3763 (collection of additional duties).
36 See Joined Cases 212 to 217/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Srl Meridionale
Industria Salumi et aL; Orlandi e Figlio and Divella v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2735. A follow-up to Joined Cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato v. Srl Meridionale Industria Salumi et aL; Orlandi e Figlio and Divella v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1237, qv. for the previous
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of legitimate expectations where the contrary result would be absurd. 7
And where the underlying economic reasoning is very clearly defective,
the trader may not need to demonstrate a particular legitimate expecta-
tion in order to defeat retroactive legislation."
The European Court has, on the whole, been reluctant to hold that
respect for traders' legitimate expectations required the adoption of tran-
sitional measures to safeguard contracts in progress:39 although from a
purely economic point of view, granting a transitional period deals ade-
quately with most genuine business expectations, the European Court
has tended to reject arguments for transitional measures, on the basis
that (a) there was an overriding public interest in favor of immediate
change, (b) it was reasonable to fear that making a transitional period
available would destroy the whole point of the change in legislation and
(c) the prudent trader should have realized anyway that change was im-
minent. The concept of the matters about which the prudent trader
"could not be unaware" is interesting not least because it assumes a fairly
permeable membrane between the Commission and the outside world.'
A. Steel
Another highly-regulated area of economic activity in the Commu-
nity is the steel sector. From being one of the building blocks of war, and
therefore one of the first products to form the subject-matter of a Euro-
pean Community, steel has become a problem area of the economy. The
situation was succinctly described by the European Court in 1985 as
follows:
"Since 1973, the.Community steel industry has been in particular difficulty
owing to the recession which has affected all economic activities and which
history of the dispute. Cf Case 21/81 Ministre Public v. Bout, BVI Bout en Zonen 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 381.
37 See Case 224/82 Firra Meiko-Konservenfabrik v. Bundesamt fir Erndhrung und Forstwirt-
schaft (BEF) 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2539.
38 Case 264/81 SPA Savma v. Commission 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3915.
39 See, e.g., Case 97/76 Merkur Aussenhandel GmbH and Co. KG v. Commission 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1063; Case 68/77 Interkontinentale Fleischhandelsgesellschaft mbH (IFG) & Co.
KG v. Commission 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 353; Case 127/78 Hans Spitta & Co. v. HZA Frank-
furt/Main Ost 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 171; Case 112/80 Firma Anton Ddirbeck v. HZA Frank-
furt-am-Main 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095; Case 96/77 SA Ancienne Maison Marcel Bauche et
SARL Frangois Delquignies v. Administration frangaise des douanes 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 383;
Case 78/77 Firma Johann Liihrs v. HZA Hamburg-Jonas 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 169; Case 90/
77 Hellmut Stimming KG v. Commission 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 995; Case 84/78 Ditta
Tomadini SNC v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1801; Case
26/81 SA Oleifici Mediterranei v. European Economic Community 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3057.
40 Joined Cases 95 to 98/74, 15 and 100/75 Union Nationale des Coopiratives Agricoles de Cir-
dales et autres v. Commission and Council 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1615.
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has entailed a reduction in demand for steel products. In addition to those
difficulties flowing from the present economic situation, the steel industry is
suffering as a result of the arrival on the common market of highly competi-
tive products manufactured in non-member countries, and as a result of
serious structural problems in the Community steel industry itself, such as
the fact that much of its plant is obsolete. All those factors have combined
to create excess capacity and a drop in prices which has affected the viabil-
ity of the greater part of the undertakings in the steel industry...".41
The Community has tried various remedies and, given the Commu-
nity's clear policy choice in favor of legislative freedom to apply here as
in agricultural markets. Various challenges brought against the system
of production quotas introduced in late 1980-both relatively straight-
forward claims of legitimate expectations42 and claims alleging retroac-
tivity43 were duly unsuccessful. Nor could steel manufacturers in
countries which acceded to the Community hope that they would get
continued special treatment as newcomers if overall Community needs
dictated otherwise.'
Even where long-term investment planning is concerned, the Euro-
pean Court has been unwilling to recognize any legitimate expectation in
the status quo or, at least, in preferential treatment when the rules
change, even where the Commission has issued an expert opinion in
favor of a particular investment.45 While the addressee of such an opin-
ion could "entertain... certain expectations regarding the profitability of
the investment" 46 (because, as the European Court recognized, the Com-
mission was "well placed" to assess the current market and expected de-
velopments),47 the difficulty of foreseeing at that time the likely
seriousness of the crisis in the steel industry sufficed to invalidate what
were otherwise, it is suggested, eminently reasonable legitimate expecta-
tions from an economic point of view.48
41 Joined Cases 63 and 147/84 Finsider SPA v. Commission 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2857 at
paragraph 4 of the judgment.
42 See Case 14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd v. Commission 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 749.
43 See Case 258/80 Spa Metallurgica Rumi v. Commission 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487: the
same argument was raised, and duly rejected, in Case 276/80 Ferriera Padana Spa v. Commission
1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 517 and in Case 235/82 Ferriere San Carlo Spa v. Commission 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3949. A situation arising from administrative practices later declared to be illegal
by the European Court may also be rectified retroactively without violating legitimate expectations:
see Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke v. High Authority 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 677.
44 Case 258/81 Metallurgiki Halyps SA v. Commission 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4261. From
an economic point of view, the case is more attractive at the macro level (the general Community
interest) than at a micro level (the business expectations of the individual steel manufacturer).
45 See Joined Cases 63 and 147/84Finsider SPA v. Commission 1985 E. Comm. Ct. I Rep. 2857.
46 Paragraph 21 of the judgment.
47 Id.
48 Cf. Case 15/85 CCA, supra. The difference in outcome between the two cases is probably best
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In the steel sector as in the agricultural sector, a plea of legitimate
expectations will occasionally be successful. Thus in Case 344/85 Fer-
riere San Carlo SpA v. Commission,49 the company convinced the Euro-
pean Court that it had not been individually informed in time of a change
in practice.5" The European Court annulled the decision fining San
Carlo and invited the Commission to reopen the file. 51
B. External trade/commercial policy
Where the external trade policy of the Community is concerned, the
European Court has approached the legitimate expectations argument in
a definitely non-interventionalist way: in Case 245/81 Edeka Zentrale
AG v. Germany52 and Case 52/81 OHG Firma Werner Faust v. Commis-
sion, 53 an almost total ban on imports of preserved mushrooms from Tai-
wan once the Community had concluded a commercial agreement with
the People's Republic of China was held not to contravene the legitimate
expectations of those who traditionally imported from, and had long-
standing trading relationships with, Taiwanese suppliers. Similarly, so
far as anti-dumping measures are concered, the Community institutions
enjoy a very wide margin of maneuver, which can be justified readily
enough in macro-economic terms (as part of the general interest in the
institutions having the freedom to implement global economic policy),
even though it may well produce unfortunate micro-economic results for
particular economic agents. Thus, the Commission may alter the
method used to calculate the dumping margin even when the product in
question is covered by a price undertaking based on one particular
method of calculation.54 An importer certainly has no legitimate expec-
explained by saying that, in CCA, the legitimate expectations arose out of a Commission error which
was not detectable by reference to outside information, whereas in Finsider, although the Commis-
sion's expert opinion was based on an erroneous assessment of market developments, the steel com-
pany could itself have realized, by observing the market, that the expert opinion was based on a
wrong economic forecast and could not serve as a foundation for a legitimate expectation. For
another successful legitimate expectations case (involving the payment of a government re-structur-
ing subsidy, or "state aid", in the shipbuilding sector) where the Commission's dilatoriness probably
explains the result, see Case 223/85 Rjn-Schelde-Verolme Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV
(RSV) v. Commission 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4617. Legitimate expectations are not usually
successful in "state aids" cases: see Case 310/85 Deufil GmbH v. Commission 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 901.
49 1987 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 4435.
50 The new practice prohibited the company from attributing a sale against stocks held-the sale
therefore became an over-quota sale and the company was fined.
51 So as to check whether the over-quota sale could be attributed to the earlier practice.
52 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2745.
53 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3745.
54 See Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Ltd v. Council 1987 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1899; see also Case
258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v. Council 1987 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1923.
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tation that provides protection against the imposition of an anti-dumping
duty that will affect contracts in progress."
C. General dealings with the administration
In practice, it is frequently the case that discussions will have taken
place between the Commission's services and traders or companies likely
to be affected by a proposed measure. Such discussions may have the
effect of putting the economic agent "on notice" that change is imminent.
Where they are apparently favorable to the company or trader con-
cerned, they can nevertheless not be relied upon as binding the Commu-
nity administration so as to prevent it from subsequently adopting other
measures or a more rigorous policy.56 When dealing with national ad-
ministrations implementing Community measures, the creation of legiti-
mate expectations depends inter alia on the right national authority
having taken the necessary action.57 Legitimate expectations are not cre-
ated by the fact that the competent authorities erroneously accepted the
documents presented to them,58 nor can they be relied on to preserve the
status quo where the trader's previous profit arose partly out of an incor-
rect calculation by a Community institution, once the error is discov-
ered.59 Legitimate expectations can, in wholly exceptional cases, be used
to fill in a clear legislative lacuna.'
The doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot be used to push the
administration into taking a particular course of action, particularly
where that might amount to allowing the enterprise concerned to substi-
tute its own economic judgment for that of the Community institution.61
55 Case 246/87 Continentale Produkten-Gesellschaft Erhardt-Renken Gmbh & Co. v. HZA
Miinchen- West, judgment of 12 May 1989, not yet reported. Here as elsewhere in this article, "not
yet reported" means that the judgment has not yet been published in the official European Court
Reports (ECRs)-it does not necessarily mean that it cannot be found elsewhere, e.g. in the Com-
mon Market Law Reports (CMLRs).
56 See Case 78/83 Union Sidirurgique du Nord et de l'Est de la France (USINOR) v. Commission
1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4177; Case 188/82 Thyssen Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3721 (the fine imposed was, however, reduced by the European Court to a token
amount); Case 67/84 SPA Sideradria v. Commission 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3983, Case 1252/79
Spa Accaiaierie e Ferriere Lucchini v. Commission 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3753; Case 8/83
Officine Fratelli Bertoli SPA v. Commission 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1649 (again, the fine origi-
nally imposed was reduced by the European Court).
57 See Case 77/88 Firma Stute Nahrungsmittelwerke GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, judgment of
15 June 1989, not yet reported.
58 See Case 316/86 HZA Hamburg-Jonas v. Firma P. Krficken, supra, and Joined Cases 98/83
and 230/83 Van Gend et Loos NV and Expeditiebedrijf Wim Bosman BV v. Commission, supra.
59 Case 112/77 Firma August Tpfer & Co. v. Commission, supra.
60 Case 165/84 J.F. Krohn Gmbh & Co. KG v. Bundesanstalt ftir Landwirtschaftliche
Marktordnung 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3997.
61 Case 64/82 Tradax Graanhandel BV v.Commission 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1359.
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The role of the Commission as a "middleman" where Third World
development projects using Community funds are concerned is not clear:
although companies have argued legitimate expectations as to the Com-
mission's behavior in that context, the European Court has so far
avoided dealing explicitly with those claims. 62 From an economic point
of view, it seems reasonable to suggest that the contractor will often find
it easier (for reasons of distance, communications, language, custom, pro-
ject management and the like) to deal with the Commission for part of
the time in such contracts rather than with the recipient government's
officials. It would be helpful to know whether, in such circumstances,
the contractor can have any legitimate expectation as to the behavior of
the Community institution (and, if so, what the limits are of that
expectation).
Because Community law and the national laws of the individual
Member States may both apply to a particular situation, cases have natu-
rally arisen in which, for example, a Community duty to recover a partic-
ular sum has been evaluated against the background of provisions of
national law which protects a bona fide recipient of funds from very be-
lated recovery proceedings. In such circumstances, the two types of pro-
tection-under national law and under Community law-appear to co-
exist. Thus in Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH
et al. v. Gennany,63 the European Court first stressed the link between
the Community law doctrine of legitimate expectations and the national
laws of the Member States:
".... the principles of the protection of legitimate expectation and assurance
of legal certainty are part of the legal order of the Community. The fact
that national legislation provides for the same principles to be observed in a
matter such as the recovery of unduly-paid Community aids cannot, there-
fore, be considered contrary to that same legal order. Moreover, it is clear
from a study of the national laws of the Member States regarding the revo-
cation of administrative decisions and the recovery of financial benefits
which have been unduly paid by public authorities that the concern to
strike a balance, albeit in different ways, between the principle of legality on
the one hand and the principles of legal certainty and the protection of
legitimate expectation on the other is common in the laws of the Member
States."64
Therefore,
"Community law does not prevent national law from having regard.., to
such considerations as the protection of legitimate expectation. . . , pro-
62 See Case 267/82 Diveloppement SA and Clemessy v. Commission 1986 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep.
1907; Case 33/82 Murri Freres v. Commission 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2759.
63 1983 E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep. 2633, 1984 3 CMLR 586.
64 Id at Paragraph 30.
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vided... that the conditions laid down are the same as for the recovery of
purely national financial benefits and the interests of the Community are
taken fully into account.",
65
III. SOME GENERAL COMMON PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS
The essential factor to be borne in mind appears to be the overriding
public interest in the conduct of what the Community regards as appro-
priate economic policy, coupled with the duty of a responsible adminis-
tration to control speculation and evasion of Community regulations.
Against that background, what elements go to establishing a successful
claim of legitimate expectations?
The caselaw pivots around the question of the foreseeability of
change; and here a distinction can be made between quantitative change
(e.g. an adjustment to MCAs), which is usually foreseeable, and qualita-
tive change, (e.g. a modification of the underlying system), where it all
depends on the nature of the change effected. Similarly, one can distin-
guish between changes of view by the authorities (which are not usually
foreseeable), changes in underlying circumstances (which may well be
foreseeable by the alert, or prudent trader), and changes caused by in-
creased problems of the same essential kind as earlier problems (which are
surely foreseeable by those engaged in that particular economic sector).
Allied to these points is the simple economic observation that changes in
the underlying economic circumstances usually mean that the regula-
tions linked to those circumstances will also change. Some regulatory
systems and economic sectors (for example, the mechanisms for financial
adjustments in the various agricultural markets) are generally recognized
as being liable to frequent and sudden changes. In those sectors, it is
virtually impossible to find a successful claim of legitimate expectations.
It also seems helpful to examine whether the applicant is in a usual
or normal situation (no legitimate expectations created) or whether it is
in an unusual or abnormal situation, either through some act of the Com-
mission or through its own act, taken on the basis of something said/
done by the Commission. In that connection, it appears clear that the
65 Id. at Paragraph 33. The passage is quoted at some length because it shows very clearly how
the Community law principle of legitimate expectations is drawn from the national legal traditions of
the individual Member States. A similar principle was applied in Joined Cases 119/79 and 126/79
Lippische Hauptgenossenschaft EG and Westfdlische Central-Genossenschaft EG v. Bundesanstaltffr
Landwirt-schaftliche Marktordnung (BALM) 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1863. Note, however, that
a change in national practice in applying Community law (from incorrect to correct application)
cannot found a successful Community law claim of legitimate expectations: Case 5/82 HZA Krefeld
v. Socit Maizena GmbH, Hamburg 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4601. The Community law doc-
trine of legitimate expectations will also not, it seems, be extended so as to fill a gap in the protection
afforded by national law: Case 210/87 Remo v. Amministrazione dellefinanze dello Stato, supra.
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applicant must have acted on the expectation (or have refrained from
taking some action which it would otherwise have taken): mere hopes in
the continuance of the status quo are not sufficient to find a legitimate
expectation. That position seems eminently sound in both theoretical
and practical terms, linked as it is both to evidential questions (demon-
stration of reliance) and to any assessment of the quantum of damage
that the applicant claims to have suffered.
The mere passage of time while negotiations go on with a Commu-
nity institution provides no basis for legitimate expectations. Passage of
time accompanied by inaction on the part of the Commission may, how-
ever, be a useful factor in helping to establish a claim to a legitimate
expectation in the apparent status quo.
Legitimate expectations are most likely to be created as a result of
discussions with the administration which put the administration on no-
tice that a trader intends to avail himself or herself of a particular provi-
sion and which lead the trader to commit himself or herself reasonably
and irrevocably to a particular course of action. If possible, therefore,
the competent authorities should be duly notified.
So far as retroactive measures are concerned (the test in Racke), it
seems likely that any matters of urgent market management by the Com-
munity authorities will be regarded as matters where the "overriding
public interest" justifies retroactive measures. It will then be necessary
for the trader to establish some special or individual interest in order to
claim a legitimate expectation in transitional measures. From a purely
economic point of view, such measures would usually provide an ade-
quate answer to most economically legitimate expectations. The Euro-
pean Court has, however, been sensitive to the possibility that such
measures will either nullify the Commission's legislative action or enable
astute speculators to make considerable profits at the Community's ex-
pense. Although the way the Racke test is formulated may be open to
criticism and could be misused, the fact remains that the actual results of
its application so far have generally been acceptable from the economic
point of view.
The question of how much disruption will be caused if the European
Court annuls a decision or regulation by upholding a claim of legitimate
expectations may also, indirectly, be relevant. How wide a door will be
opened by helping a particular applicant? How much will it matter if the
applicant benefits from an exception to the general rule (whatever that
rule may be)? Interestingly, the European Court is sometimes (as in the
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milk quota cases, Case 120/86 Mulder and Case 170/86 Von Deetzen)
66
prepared to annul a faulty piece of legislation in the full knowledge that
the other institutions will then be left with an awkward problem that
they will have to solve.
Very few cases succeed on the legitimate expectations argument. It
is quite difficult to point to generic distinguishing features in those cases,
save perhaps for the underlying feature that a decision going the other
way would usually have made neither economic nor legal sense. Part of
the answer may indeed lie in the essentially pragmatic attitude of the
European Court: if the result of going one way in a particular case
would be inequitable, or economically unsound, an argument is found for
holding the other way.
The doctrine of legitimate expectations in Community law is, in
some ways, rather intangible. Nevertheless, the fact that it exists and
can, if necessary, be invoked provides a useful protection for the individ-
ual economic agent as the ever-increasing layers of legislation are set in
place for the completion of the Community's internal market.
66 See supra note 13.
